An airline plans for a closure with no end date by preparing several exit scenarios, pairing each with a signal to watch and a decision to take, and by testing those decisions before the next crisis. Riyadh King Khalid International Airport (RUH) shows why. It closed after an attack on 10 October 2026. From 18 October it has operated on a restricted basis, with flights subject to prior permission from Saudi Arabia's General Authority of Civil Aviation (GACA) (Fragomen, 27 October 2026; Aerospace Global News, 19 October 2026). Until the closure ends, the airline plans its network, fleet and sales without knowing the date.
Semra Erener's PhD thesis, completed in November 2025, surveyed 324 employees at 14 Turkish airlines (Erener Özalçın and Çolakoğlu, 2025). The answers showed high trust in the crisis plan, while employees contributed unequally to scenario preparation and exercises. The closures since 28 February 2026 show why airlines in Dubai, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia benefit from closing that gap now.
The region entered 2026 with a warning. During the attack on Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar on 23 June 2025, Qatar, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait closed their airspace for a short time (AirlineGeeks; Crisis24). On 16 January 2026, the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) published a conflict zone bulletin for Iran and the neighbouring airspace (EASA, CZIB-2026-02).
Traffic kept growing. Dubai International Airport (DXB) closed 2025 with 95.2 million passengers, up 3.1%, and Saudi Arabia was Dubai's second-largest market with 7.5 million passengers (Dubai Media Office, 11 February 2026). Total passengers at Saudi airports rose 9.6% to 140.9 million in 2025 (GACA data, reported by Argaam, 29 January 2026).
After the strikes on Iran on 28 February 2026, UAE airspace partly closed and operations stopped at Dubai's two airports. Qatar, Kuwait and Bahrain also closed their airspace (The National, 28 February 2026). Kuwaiti airspace stayed closed until 23 April (WAM, 24 April 2026). The UAE General Civil Aviation Authority (GCAA) announced a full return to normal air navigation on 2 May (WAM, 2 May 2026). Passenger numbers at Dubai International Airport in the first half of 2026 fell 31.3% year on year to 31.5 million (Dubai Airports, reported by WAM). Air traffic in Kuwait stopped again briefly on 3 June, 6 June and 11 June, and on 18 July. Figure 1 puts these closures on one timeline.
Airspace and airport closures in the Gulf, 2026
UAE (Dubai), Kuwait and Riyadh, 1 January to 3 November. Numbers mark the dates listed below the chart.
28 February to 2 May: partial closure and restrictions. Full return to normal air navigation announced on 2 May.
28 February to 23 April: closed. 3, 6 and 11 June: short closures. 18 July: closed again, end date not confirmed; Qatar Airways flew to Kuwait again on 8 August.
8 October: first attack. 10 to 18 October: closed. From 18 October: restricted, with prior permission from GACA.
ClosedPartly open or restrictedEnd date not confirmed
Figure 1. Airspace and airport closures in the Gulf, January to November 2026. Source: EASA CZIB list (read on 5 November 2026, no change); WAM; GACA (SPA); Al Arabiya; Fragomen; The National.
The crisis that started in October 2026 differs from the one in February: airspace is largely open, but airports are the targets. After an attack on Riyadh on 8 October, a second attack on 10 October suspended operations at the airport, and GACA extended the suspension for safety checks (SPA, 12 October 2026), to 17 October. After the restricted opening on 18 October, Terminals 1 and 2 entered service on 25 October (The National, 25 October 2026; Khaleej Times). Cirium data shows that 4,071 of the 4,736 departures scheduled from Riyadh between 8 and 25 October, or 86%, were cancelled or did not fly (Gulf News, 26 October 2026). Dammam Airport was attacked on 11 October and 21 October. On 29 October, Saudi Civil Defense warned the public in Riyadh through the National Early Warning Platform (The Peninsula, 29 October 2026).
A full airport closure and an airspace advisory are separate decisions, and an airline's plan benefits from treating them separately. EASA published a bulletin on 30 September and updated it on 9 October. It advises operators not to operate at any altitude in a defined part of the Jeddah Flight Information Region (FIR), the block of airspace managed from Jeddah, and to take care in the rest of the region. A separate bulletin covers the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman. Both bulletins are valid until 16 November 2026 (EASA, CZIB-2026-09-R1 and CZIB-2026-07R3, read on 5 November 2026).
The reading offered here is that the nearest date an airline publishes in its booking system, its suspension date, gives the best available guide to how long a closure will last. Those dates move. KLM has extended its Riyadh and Dammam suspension five times since 1 July: first to 23 August, then to 6 September, 24 October and 31 October, and in its latest update on 26 October to 27 November (KLM, 26 October 2026). Lufthansa extended its Riyadh suspension to 18 November (Lufthansa Group, 28 October 2026) and Air France to 12 December (Air France, 5 November 2026). Qatar Airways suspended its Riyadh, Dammam, Abha and Taif flights on 12 October (Qatar Airways, 12 October 2026) and extended the Riyadh and Dammam suspension to 24 October; The National's update of 25 October gave no new end date. Delta moved the launch of its Atlanta to Riyadh route from 23 October to March 2027 (Delta, 12 October 2026; AirlineGeeks, 19 December 2025). Cathay Pacific's Riyadh suspension is reported to run until 31 January 2027 (The Standard).
The data consolidator flightsfrom.com showed 61 airlines with scheduled flights from Riyadh on 30 October 2026. The airlines named above state in their own announcements how long their flights are suspended, and Figure 2 shows these dates alongside dates reported by the press.
Airline suspensions at Riyadh from 10 October
Suspension end dates published by airlines or reported by the press, as read on 3 November 2026.
Suspended: airline's own noticeSuspended: press reportReturned or return plan (press)No end date or new route delayed
Figure 2. Airline suspensions at Riyadh from 10 October. Source: airlines' own pages (Lufthansa Group, Qatar Airways, Air France, KLM, Delta), read again on 5 November 2026; others Gulf News (29 September, 2 November and 5 November 2026), The National, 25 October 2026, and MainlyMiles, 8 October 2026.
Figure 3 compares the schedules already published for Riyadh, Dubai and Kuwait airports with the decisions that airlines had taken by 3 November 2026. For 36 of the 61 airlines on the Riyadh schedule, 68 of 89 at Dubai and 25 of 33 at Kuwait, no current statement was found.
What airlines had decided by 3 November
Airlines in the 30 October schedule list for each airport, grouped by the status found.
Suspended: airline's own noticeSuspended: press reportReturned or announced a return planLocal or home-based carrierNo current information found
Figure 3. Status on 3 November 2026 of the airlines in the schedule list. List: flightsfrom.com, 30 October 2026 (the Dubai and Kuwait pages say 90 and 34; the lists show 89 and 33 names). Status: airline notices, Gulf News, The National.
When nobody knows when a closure will end, an airline benefits from several scenarios instead of one plan. A scenario is a preparation tool: it describes a path the closure can take, and the airline agrees in advance what to watch and what to do on that path. For each scenario, the airline sets the signal to watch and the decision to take when that signal comes. In a short closure, the signals are the authority's reopening announcement and a NOTAM (the formal notice to airlines that closes or restricts airspace) that is not extended. The decisions cover a phased return of the schedule and the repositioning of aircraft, crew and passengers. In a long closure, the signals are repeated extensions and suspensions that move to new dates. The decisions cover alternative airports, moving capacity to other markets, and sales and refund policy. If the crisis escalates again, the signal is a new attack or a new airspace restriction. The decisions cover routes outside the restricted area, extra flight time, the fuel plan and communication about passenger safety.
Crisis exit scenarios: signal, decision and signs seen
Each scenario pairs a signal to watch with the decision taken when it appears.
Figure 4. Crisis exit scenario matrix, with signs seen up to 3 November 2026. Sources as cited in this article; the tanker incident is from UKMTO, reported by Gulf News, 5 November 2026.
One of the hardest decisions during a closure is the choice of an alternative airport. When Kuwaiti airspace closed on 28 February, Jazeera Airways kept flying by moving its operations to Al Qaisumah in Saudi Arabia (Al Arabiya, 8 March 2026) and, from 26 March, to Dammam (Aviation Week). This is a concrete example of fast adaptation to a closure. In the conditions of that time, airports in the neighbouring country were a natural option. In October, the attacks moved towards Saudi airports, and Dammam was targeted on 11 and 21 October. This raised a new planning question for all airlines in the region: when the geography of a crisis changes, the choice of alternative airport has to be reviewed too. An alternative airport plan benefits from resting on several options in different risk areas, with each option tested in a separate scenario.
As of early November 2026, Saudi Arabia is the country directly affected by the crisis that started in October. Its exit scenario depends on the full reopening of Riyadh and on the EASA advisory for the Jeddah FIR. Saudi carriers are already using alternative airports: flyadeal, Saudia and flynas moved some Riyadh flights to Gassim Airport (ELQ), with a bus transfer (Gulf News, 30 October 2026; flynas). Foreign carriers are announcing their return in phases, and their dates have moved more than once, as the KLM updates show.
Air traffic in Kuwait stopped several times in 2026: for two months from 28 February, briefly in June, and again on 18 July. After the July closure, Qatar Airways returned to daily flights on 8 August (The National, 6 August 2026). Emirates returned at the end of August with one flight a day, against four a day before the crisis (The National, 24 August 2026). On 2 October 2026, Kuwait's Public Authority for Civil Aviation (PACA) repeated that the transit suspension would continue until further notice (Kuwait Times, 3 October 2026). As a result, passengers cannot connect through Kuwait to another destination. For now, this limits the networks of Kuwait Airways and Jazeera Airways to journeys that start or end in Kuwait. Scenario work for Kuwait therefore centres on two questions: which routes can continue without transfer passengers, and in what order connections can be rebuilt when transit is allowed again.
Dubai is the open hub inside the crisis. After the 31.3% fall in the first half, monthly passengers rose from 5 million in June to 6.3 million in July (Gulf News, 11 September 2026). European carriers are also returning in phases. British Airways restarted flights on 3 November (Gulf News, 3 November 2026). Lufthansa Group plans to return from 25 November (Lufthansa Group, 28 October 2026). KLM will not fly to Dubai until 27 March 2027 (KLM, 26 October 2026), and Air Canada's Dubai suspension runs to the end of March 2027 (Gulf News, 29 September 2026). Scenario work for Dubai manages two things together: the recovery in demand and the risk that the crisis escalates again in the Gulf. EASA's Gulf bulletin shows that this risk remains in force.
An airline manages an unknown end date in three steps: defining in advance the signals that show which scenario is happening, naming the decision and the person responsible for each signal, and testing these decisions before a crisis comes. The end date of a closure is a variable outside an airline's control, and nobody can forecast it with certainty. The organisational response is the part an airline can manage. Network, fleet and sales choices made under this uncertainty are commercial operations decisions.
The finding in the thesis comes from employees of Turkish airlines and offers a pointer for the Gulf, not a direct measurement. The pointer is a useful one: trust in a plan and preparation of that plan are separate things. The reading offered here is that preparedness grows with how far an organisation has learned its plan and made it workable, and the existence of a plan is where that work starts.
About this analysis. Semra Erener, Principal Consultant at Rock 'n Roll CEO, has worked in aviation for more than twenty years. This is an independent analysis. Neither the author nor Rock 'n Roll CEO has a consulting relationship with any of the airlines mentioned. The timeline, the airline suspension calendar and the figures come from the websites of authorities, airlines and EASA, read between 19 October and 5 November 2026. Where an airline's own statement could not be found, news agencies and the aviation press are used, with dates. The airline list comes from flightsfrom.com, taken on 30 October 2026. The data is at consolidator level and has not been checked against a primary schedule source.
